This paper takes a contingent claim approach to the market valuation of equity and liabilities in life insurance companies. A model is presented which explicitly takes into account the facts that the holders of life insurance contracts (LICs) have the first claim on the company's assets whereas equityholders have limited liability, that interest rate guarantees are common elements of LICs, and that LICs according to the so-called contribution principle are entitled to receive a fair share of any investment surplus. Furthermore, a regulatory mechanism in the form of an intervention rule is built into the model. This mechanism is shown to significantly reduce the insolvency risk of the issued contracts and it implies that the various claims on the company's assets become more exotic and obtain barrier option properties. Closed valuation formulas are nevertheless derived. Finally, some representative numerical examples illustrate how the model can be used to establish the set of initially fair contracts and to determine the market values of contracts after their inception.
Introduction
The subject of fair valuation of life insurance liabilities has attracted a lot of attention in the insurance and finance literature in recent years. This is caused by the product structure of the life insurance business as well as certain events in the financial markets and we commence with a discussion of these.
First of all, the late 1980s through the 1990s was a period of quite some turmoil for the life insurance business, and Europe, Japan, and the United States can all present their own spectacularly long lists of defaulted life insurance companies. Many of these were relatively small but there were also examples of some massive defaults of large economic significance. These examples include the U.S.'s First Executive Corporation ($19 billion in assets), France's Garantie Mutuelle des Functionnaires (see Briys and de Varenne (1994) ), and Nissan Mutual Life of Japan which went bankrupt with uncovered liabilities of $2.56 billion (see Grosen and Jørgensen (2000) ).
In retrospective discussions of the reasons for these unfortunate events, three issues appear repeatedly. The first is the mismanagement of the interest rate guarantees issued with most life insurance policies. The second is the mismanagement of credit risk stemming from either side of the balance sheet, and the third relates to the application of poor or inappropriate accounting principles which in many cases have critically delayed or suppressed potentially useful warning signs in relation to company solvency. These issues are of course closely interrelated as will be further clarified in the subsequent discussion.
The focus on the interest rate guarantee relates to the fact that most policies contain an explicit guarantee that the holder's account will be credited -on a year-to-year basis -with a rate of return (the policy interest rate) of at least some fixed guaranteed rate, say 5%. At the time of issuance the guaranteed interest rate has typically been (much) lower than prevailing market interest rates, a fact which has led companies to ignore their value (as well as their risk) and, to the best of the authors' knowledge, premiums for these issued guarantees (read: liabilities) have not been demanded anywhere prior to 1999.
1 However, as a result of a period where market interest rates have generally been declining and where guaranteed interest rates have been held fixed, the companies have experienced a dramatic narrowing in the safety margin between the earning power 1 In 1999, the largest Danish life insurance company, Danica, introduced an annual premium for the interest rate guarantees issued at the highest level, 4.5%. The premium amounted to 0.5% of the life insurance liabilities. Another Danish company, Skandia Liv, has introduced annual charges of 0.27% and 0.17% for contracts issued with interest rate guarantees of 4.5% and 2.5% respectively. of their assets and the claims from issued liabilities. This particular development is a major source of the problems of some life insurance companies, although it is also kind of ironic since the fundamental function of insurance companies in general is to provide a guarantee of asset value to the customer, as pointed out by e.g. Merton and Bodie (1992) . Interest rate guarantees are thus a source of credit risk arising from the liability side of the balance sheet.
The regulatory authorities in Japan as well as in the EU countries have responded to the threat of insolvency from the return guarantees by lowering the maximum interest rate that can legally be guaranteed to policyholders.
2 Table 1 illustrates this development by showing the level of the prevalent maximum technical rates, the previous maximum rates, as well as some (approximate) dates of recent reductions for the EU member countries, Japan, and a few other countries. 
Notes to the table:
The information in this table is compiled from a number of sources the most important of which is "Survey on the rating of the principal categories of individual life insurance contracts", Comité Européen des Assurances, October 1998. The entire material is available from the authors on request.
Reduction on the way. For some older contracts. For national and hard currency based contracts respectively. These regulatory initiatives have forced companies to lower the guaranteed rates for new contracts. Consequently, it is now quite common for life insurance companies to have (cohorts of) policies with different guaranteed rates in the same fund. This raises the question of how to avoid inequitable treatment of the different classes of policyholders. The common, "easy-way-out"-approach of attempting to credit all policies with an identical rate which is higher than or equal to the largest guaranteed rate in the fund may very well enhance the default risk of a business that is already in trouble. Clearly, the correct route to a fair distribution of surplus among a family of unequal claims goes via a market valuation of the various claims -an issue that we will address further below as a key objective of the paper.
In relation to the market valuation of life insurance liabilities it is also worth noting that initiatives have been taken by the insurance business itself as well as by the accounting profession. In 1994, for example, the American Academy of Actuaries appointed a Fair Valuation of Liabilities Task Force to consider the problems associated with the measurement of fair value, see e.g. Babbel and Merrill (1998) and Babbel and Merrill (1999) . The Task Force report is contained in Vanderhoof and Altman (1998) along with several other significant contributions to the understanding of the fair value of insurance liabilities. The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) has also addressed the problem of market value accounting by issuing a series of statements of standards concerning derivative financial instruments in general (e.g. FAS 107, 115, 119, 133, and 137) and life insurance liabilities in particular (FAS 120) . 3 In addition, the International Accounting Standard Committee (IASC) has launched a project to develop an international Generally Accepted Accounting Principle for insurers which can be accepted by stock markets, regulators, and the insurance industry. The reader is referred to Forfar and Masters (1999) for a more detailed discussion of the present work towards developing international accounting standards for the life insurance business. The IASC Steering Committee is expected to publish the International Accounting Standard in the Fall of
2002.
The above-mentioned initiatives can be interpreted as evidence of increased acceptance and understanding of the fact that interest rate guarantees (as one among sometimes many embedded options in life insurance contracts) are liabilities to the issuer. 4 Such issued options represent valuable obligations and constitute potential hazards to company solvency and they should therefore be included in a proper valuation of the liabilities, cf. also discussions later in the paper. Historically, this has not been done and in our opinion the FASB and IASC initiatives represent tremendous potential for improving the transparency of the accounts of life insurance companies. In particular, it seems more than likely that mark-to-market accounting can serve as the basis of a better earlywarning system than the ancient accounting systems based on book values (i.e. amortized acquisition cost) and/or historical values. The opportunities for monitoring by shareholders, policyholders, and regulatory authorities should also inevitably be enhanced. 5 The effective monitoring and regulation of a life insurance company for which market values of all elements of the balance sheet can be established is another key objective of this paper.
The present paper has been motivated by the issues discussed above and we will set up a stylized, dynamic model for a life insurance company in which the issues of the interest rate guarantees, insolvency risk, and market valuation of the balance sheet elements as well as some additional issues can be handled. The liability and equity contracts will be priced and analyzed as financial economists deal with contingent claims., i.e. we will make use of the rich toolbox of contingent claims analysis, e.g. no-arbitrage and martingale pricing techniques. We are obviously not the first to take this approach and a discussion of related literature will clarify where our contributions lie. Brennan and Schwartz (1976) , Boyle and Schwartz (1977) , and Brennan and Schwartz (1979) were the first papers that elegantly described some of the option elements of life insurance products and demonstrated how the then relatively young option pricing theory of Black and Scholes (1973) could be applied to value these contracts. The contracts considered in the above-mentioned papers were so-called unit-linked contracts without credit risk and with option elements of European type. 6 Baccinello and Ortu (1993b), Grosen and Jørgensen (1997) and Nielsen and Sandmann (1995) represent other, more recent papers which all analyze some form of unit-linked contracts. For example, Grosen and Jørgensen (1997) establish arbitrage free prices of unit-linked contracts with a return guarantee and the American-style option to exercise prematurely by applying results from American option pricing theory. They also point out that the value of the option to exercise prematurely is precisely the value of the surrender option implicit in many life insurance contracts.
However elegant, the concentration of papers analyzing unit-linked policies sharply contrasts the economic significance of these products in the insurance market where so-called participating (or with UK-terminology, with profits) policies are by far the most important. Participating policies allow the holders to participate in upside returns as the policies may receive bonus in addition to the promised payments implied by the interest rate guarantee. The issue of describing and analyzing the bonus distribution mechanism is highly complex 7 and this undoubtedly explains why so few papers have dealt with this issue. However, there is now increasing interest in unveiling the structure of these mechanisms and in analyzing participating policies, as documented by recent papers by Miltersen and Persson (1998) , Briys and de Varenne (1994) , Briys and de Varenne (1997), Grosen and Jørgensen (2000) , and Jensen, Jørgensen, and Grosen (2001) . In particular the model by Briys and de Varenne (henceforth the BV model) contains a participation mechanism and distinguishes itself by taking the credit risk of the issuer explicitly into account in the valuation of the insureds'
claims.
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The principle underlying the BV model is Merton's (Merton (1974 , 1977 , 1978 , 1989 ) option pricing approach to the valuation of corporate debt, deposit insurance and financial intermediaries.
Following Merton, Briys and de Varenne introduce the default risk of the insurer as a put option arising from the limited liability enjoyed by equityholders when the insurer issues debt, i.e. insurance policies. The option is of European type and if at the date of maturity the company is unable to meet the insureds' demands, the shareholders simply walk away. Hence, equityholders do not incur all the downside cost of default while capturing some of the upside earnings. Because of this asymmetric payoff the insolvency put option increases in value as the insurer takes on more risk.
The present paper takes the BV model as its point of departure and the reason for this is threefold.
Firstly, the BV framework is well-known and the model was one of the first to take the credit risk of the insurer into account in the economic valuation of insurance liabilities. Secondly, the simplicity of the bonus distribution mechanism in the BV model allows us to derive closed formulas for contract values and to easily perform various sensitivity analyses even after significantly extending the model. Thirdly, we believe that despite the simplifications in the bonus distribution mechanism, the BV model remains a fairly good proxy for the different kind of interest rate guarantees embedded in life insurance contracts across countries and types of contracts. In this last respect time may in fact work for the BV model in the sense that the interest rate guarantees embedded in life 7 See the discussion in Grosen and Jørgensen (2000) .
insurance contracts presently seem to be subject to redesign in many countries. This is happening as a response to the potential insolvency problems induced by the previously common design where the guaranteed minimum annual return implied a binding floor under the cash values of contracts that was ratcheted upwards each time profits were shared with contract holders. In Denmark, for example, many insurance companies are now changing their distribution mechanism from the above-mentioned ratcheting system to a mechanism which implies what is referred to as conditional bonus and which is very similar to the system modeled by Briys and de Varenne (1997) .
However, a significant weakness of the BV model is that it evaluates stakeholders' claims and detects bankruptcy only at the maturity date. Despite its formulation in continuous time it is essentially a single-period model where a dynamic element of the insolvency put option is lost and, perhaps more importantly, the built-in interest rate guarantee serves no specific purpose as it is indistinguishable from an absolute maturity guarantee (see the discussions in Boyle and Hardy (1997) and Grosen and Jørgensen (2000) ). We aim at correcting this weakness and reintroducing the dynamic element to the BV model by imposing a certain regulatory restriction which assumes continuous monitoring of the solvency of the firm and a closure rule based on the nominal liability implied by the interest rate guarantee. This extension opens for a wide range of interesting analyses in relation to the issues discussed earlier in this introduction.
The cost of adding realism to the model in this way will be increased complexity of the options involved. More specifically, the stakeholders' claims will change from plain vanilla options to more exotic option types with features similar to so-called financial knock-out barrier options. Luckily, the possibility of deriving closed formulas is not destroyed by this extension. We establish these rather complex formulas which are interesting in themselves from an option theorist's point of view, and we implement them to provide a sample of illustrative numerical examples.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains the model basics and in section 3 the details of the various contracts and the regulatory mechanism are explained. Pricing formulas for the contracts are presented in section 4 (derivations are in the appendix) and these formulas are implemented in section 5 which also contains a wide variety of illustrative, representative examples.
Section 6 contains our conclusions as well as some suggestions for future research.
Model Basics
In this section we introduce the model which will be used to analyze the aspects of the life insurance products discussed in the introduction. After a brief presentation of some basics we will move on to describing the precise characteristics of the various model claims and then to presenting a dynamic framework for the valuation of these claims.
The basic framework is inspired by Briys and de Varenne (1997) and is as follows. Agents are assumed to operate in a continuous time frictionless economy with a perfect financial market, so that tax effects, transactions costs, divisibility, liquidity, and short sales constraints, and other imperfections can be ignored.
The financial arrangement which we are interested in analyzing is initiated at time zero where two (groups of) agents -policyholders and equityholders -agree on forming a mutual company, the life insurance company. 9 The two agents each invest a sum of money in the company whereby they form the company's initial asset base, $ , as illustrated by the time zero balance sheet below where / $ is the initial investment by the policyholders and where ( $ is the initial investment by the equityholders. The parameter is referred to as the wealth distribution coefficient.
Figure 1
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By their initial investments the agents acquire a claim for a payoff on or before the maturity date 7 . As will shortly become clear these claims are very similar to financial derivatives with the company's assets as the well-defined underlying asset. Hence, given a precise description of the various claim characteristics we can first price the balance sheet elements using the powerful apparatus of contingent claims valuation. Second, and perhaps more importantly, with the valuation formulas in hand we can explore and describe combinations of contract characteristics (parameters) 9 It is natural to think of the first type of agents as buying a policy from the company and as the second type of agents as residual claimants, and, hence, as policyholders and equityholders respectively. and initial investment amounts which lead to fair distribution of value in the sense that initial investments equal the time zero market value of the associated contingent claims.
While it is natural to assume that all contracts are initiated at fair terms it should be realized that as soon as contract terms are fixed and time passes, changes in the underlying variable (total assets) will inevitably be observed. This will lead to changes in the market values of the balance sheet elements and to a redistribution of wealth between policyholders and equityholders. In a world where accounting practices and legislation are changing towards demanding market values in accounting statements (cf. the introduction), it will be important to have models that can determine these values at all times and in all states of the economy. The present paper should be seen as an attempt to construct such a model.
Contract Specifications
This section describes the details of the stakeholders' claims on the company's assets. We begin with a specification of the liabilityholders' claim. 
The Liabilityholders' Claim
As discussed in the introduction, most life insurance policies contain an explicit interest rate guarantee, i.e. a guarantee that the invested funds will accumulate by at least some preset, fixed rate. In our terminology this means that the 'company' promises the policyholders a continuously compounded return on the initial market value of the liabilities of at least U * during the life of the contract. This translates into a guaranteed final payment of / * 7 / H U * 7 . In this connection, two observations are in order. First, as we assume the absence of an external guarantor, the company's promise can be honored only if it turns out that $ 7 ! / * 7 at time 7 . In the opposite case, $ 7 / * 7 , and in the event that the company has not been prematurely shut down by regulators, the contractholders receive $ 7 and leave the equityholders with nothing. Second, note that if there are neither intermediate cash flows nor regulatory evaluations (audits) of the company between time and 7 , then the return guarantee introduced earlier is exactly equivalent to a simple maturity guarantee for some fixed dollar amount as analyzed in e.g. Merton's classic paper (Merton (1974) ). In other words, in order for return guarantees to play a non-trivial rôle they must either be used to calculate wealth 10 We shall use the terms liabilityholders and policyholders interchangeably.
accumulations to contracts on a period-by-period basis (as in e.g. Miltersen and Persson (1998) and Grosen and Jørgensen (2000) ) or be used in the definition of a regulatory benchmark throughout the life of the contract (this will be clarified shortly).
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Now, in addition to the promised maturity payment implied by the guaranteed rate of return, contractholders are also generally entitled to receive bonus if the market value of the assets evolves sufficiently favorable. 12 Recent literature (cf. the introduction) has intensely debated how to realistically model this bonus option element of life insurance contracts. 13 Here we adopt the approach of Briys and de Varenne (1997) who, assuming assets are earmarked from the beginning, specify the payoff of the bonus option as
From (1) it is clear that in final states where the policyholders' 'share' of total value exceeds the promised payment of / * 7 they will receive a fraction, , of this surplus. The parameter models the extent to which the policyholders participate in upside payoffs and is hence denoted as the participation coefficient. Fair values of must lie in the interval > > with representingin some sense -payment for the partial downside protection.
Summing up, the total maturity payoff to policyholders, / $ 7 , can be described as
or more compactly
The first part of the right-hand side has already been labeled as the bonus option. The two remaining terms correspond to a fixed maturity payment and a shorted put option respectively, and are hence collectively equivalent to a risky (defaultable) bond payoff. 14 Figure 2 is a graphical illustration of (3).
11 For more on the difference between rate of return guarantees and maturity guarantees, see the discussion in Grosen and Jørgensen (2000) . 12 This rests on the broadly defined contribution principle of life insurance, see e.g. Black and Skipper (1994) , p. 608. 13 See also the general discussion on the (in)efficiency of bonus mechanisms in life insurance in Brennan (1993) . 14 Note that the structure of the payoff function in (3) is also very similar to the payoff of a convertible security as discussed e.g. in Ingersoll (1987) be used for valuation. However, inspired by real life facts we wish to add a dimension -and hence realism -to the model by imposing a regulatory restriction. Technically, suppose that in the framework above, the options will only be allowed to expire provided
where the curve I%WJ W7 , will henceforth be referred to as the regulatory boundary. The interpretation and motivation for this restriction are straightforward: / H U * W is the policyholders' initial deposit compounded with the guaranteed rate of return up to time W. Therefore, only in the event that the total assets at all times have been sufficient to cover this nominal liability multiplied by some prespecified constant, (the boundary level parameter), will the stakeholders' options live through to the date of maturity.
In the opposite event, assets will at some point in time, ¡ , have assumed a market value such that $ ¡ % ¡ . In this situation the market value of the assets is at a critical low and we will assume that regulatory authorities close down the company immediately and distribute the recovered wealth to stakeholders.
At this point we note that there are two interesting cases. For and in the event of a boundary hit, the trustees will be able to repay to policyholders their initial deposit compounded with the promised rate of return, U * , up to the closure date. At the same date there will be a positive surplus of / H U * ¡ for distribution to either equityholders, regulatory authorities or other third parties (lawyers). Hence, corresponds to a situation where regulatory authorities prevent defaults by allowing continued operation solely for companies that have a 'buffer' of a certain magnitude between the market value of their assets and the nominal obligations to policyholders.
Conversely, corresponds to a situation where regulatory authorities allow temporary and limited deficits and if default is triggered in this situation, the recovered assets will not be sufficient to cover the policyholders' initial deposit compounded with the guaranteed return up to date ¡ . 15 We assume that policyholders will then be given the entire recovered market value and equityholders must walk away empty-handed. The various situations are illustrated in the figures below. In particular note that as , the model of Briys and de Varenne (1997) is recovered as a special case of our model, cf. also later. This situation can also be seen as corresponding to total regulatory laxity.
With the above-mentioned regulatory restriction imposed, the solution of the model, i.e. the determination of ( and / , has become considerably more involved. Specifically the stakeholders' claims have changed from plain vanilla options to more exotic types of options with features in common with so-called financial knock-out barrier options. In the proposed set-up the knock-out barrier is exponential and defined as the earlier introduced curve I% W J W7 .
As described above there will be a compensation to policyholders in the event of premature closure at the hitting time ¡ . Formally, and in accordance with the discussion above this rebate, / ¡ , is given as
Before considering the valuation of the composite contingent claim, / / , we describe the details regarding the equityholders' claim.
The Equityholders' Claim
The maturity payoff to equityholders is implicit in the discussions in the previous section. As residual claimants, equityholders will receive a payoff at the maturity date conditional on no premature closure as follows:
It is observed that the payoff to equityholders is the difference between two call options. The long option is simply a call on total assets with an exercise price equal to the promised maturity payment to the liabilityholders. The shorted call is the bonus option issued to liabilityholders. This type of payoff function is depicted in Figure 4 below.
As regards a possible premature closure rebate to equityholders, the previous section established that there could be no such rebate in a regime where . However, in the case where ! there 
Valuation
With the stakeholders' claims well described we can now move on to considering the pricing of their various elements as described above. For this purpose we naturally need to specify a dynamic model for the evolution of the assets through time. We choose to adopt the basic framework of Black and Scholes (1973) where all activity occurs on a filtered probability space ) ) W 3 supporting Brownian motion on the finite time interval > 7 @. In this set-up, the dynamic evolution of the assets is described by the stochastic differential equation
where and are positive constants and I: 3 W J is a standard Brownian motion under 3 . 16 Assuming that the riskless interest rate, U, is constant and positive we have
where I: 4 W J is a standard Brownian motion under the familiar equivalent risk-neutral probability measure, 4 (see Harrison and Kreps (1979) ). Equation (10) defines the well-known geometric Brownian motion and this particular choice is crucial for the later derivation of closed formulas for the values of the balance sheet elements.
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The risk-neutral process and measure are introduced in order to facilitate valuation by taking advantage of the powerful apparatus of martingale pricing: Under the probability measure 4, all discounted value processes will be martingales (Harrison and Kreps (1979) ). As a direct consequence, letting 9 L $ W W, L / (, denote the time W value of the liability-and equityholders' claims respectively, we can write (see e.g. Ingersoll (1987) , p. 369-370)
where I $ 7 7 $ W W denotes the defective risk-neutral density for the value of the assets at time 7 with an absorbing barrier I% W J W7 imposed and conditional on the current status of the assets.
Similarly, J¡ $ W W denotes the risk-neutral first hitting time density of $ through the absorbing barrier conditional on the position $ W at time W.
Establishing these two densities is obviously crucial for the further manipulation of the general valuation result above. Their derivation is non-trivial since in the present problem the boundary is exponential as opposed to constant in the barrier options literature that we are aware of and which has otherwise inspired our approach. The densities in question are derived in Appendices A and B to this paper enabling us to present the first main result of the paper. 16 The assumption of a constant drift rate in the asset value process is stronger than necessary. The analysis that follows would carry through without changes with a time and/or state dependent drift rate. 17 The assumption of a constant interest rate obviously imposes limitations on the analyses in this paper and our later numerical results should be interpreted with this assumption in mind. The advantage of the assumption is that it allows us to derive relatively simple closed form valuation formulas, cf. later. We note that while it is possible to include stochastic interest rates in our setting, such an extension renders highly complex valuation formulas at best, and in the interest of simplicity and since we are mainly concerned with studying effects other than those created by a stochastically changing term structure of interest rates, we refrain from presenting this extension here. 18 Although most other processes for the asset value evolution would not lead to closed valuation formulas, the properties of the model using alternative processes could still be explored, for example by means of Monte Carlo simulation.
Theorem 1: The Value of the Liabilityholders' Claim
The maturity payment to the liabilityholders conditional on no barrier hit given as / $ 7 in (3) is composed of three parts: A bonus (call) option element, a fixed payment, and a shorted put option element. In the event of a premature barrier hit there will be a rebate payment specified by / in (5). 9 / $ W W is the sum of the time W value of these four separate elements as given below in parts I-IV where we have used the notation
and where 1 denotes the cumulative standard normal distribution function.
Departing from (3) and (11) 
Finally, departing from (5) and (11) we find IV:
IV: The time W value of the rebate
(
Theorem 2: The Value of the Equityholders' Claim
The maturity payment to the equityholders conditional on no barrier hit given as ( $ 7 in (6)- (7) is the difference between two call option payoffs: One straight residual claim call option and another call option which corresponds precisely to the liabilityholders' bonus option. In the event of a premature boundary hit there may be a rebate payment to the equityholders as specified in (8).
9 ( $ W W is the sum of the time W value of these three separate elements as listed below.
I: The time W value of the long residual claim (call option) element
where < % 7 B / * 7 .
II:
The time W value of the shorted bonus option See Part II of Theorem 1.
III: The time W value of the equityholders' rebate
As discussed in section 3.2, a rebate to the equityholders is only an 'option' when ! . Referring to (8) we can thus write 
Implementation and Numerical Examples

Fair Contracts
The formulas for the values of the liability and equity claims which were derived in the previous section are truly closed formulas that can be readily implemented once the relevant parameters are given.
It is clear that not every choice of parameters will represent fair contracts, i.e. contracts which have been initiated with a fair value split between the stakeholders. For example, the guaranteed interest rate, U * , and the participation coefficient, , cannot both be arbitrarily high (to the benefit of policyholders) with everything else held fixed. So a relevant first question to ask is which combinations of parameters will represent fair contracts. This question can be answered by establishing solutions to the equation
which formalizes the requirement that in equilibrium we must establish equality between the liabilityholders' initial contribution to the total assets and the initial market value of their acquired contingent claim. Since we must have
an equivalent approach would be to take the equityholders' point of view and explore solutions to
Regardless of whether we choose to work with (13) or (15) we will have to establish solutions via numerical search routines in much the same way as implied volatilities are usually backed out from the Black-Scholes formula. We note, however, that due to the composite and more complex structure of our valuation formulas, a full-blown investigation of e.g. the form of the solution set, comparative statics, conditions for existence and uniqueness of solutions etc. will be a formidable task. We refrain from performing such an analysis and merely provide some selected representative plots to illustrate some typical relations between parameters of initially fair contracts.
Figures 5 to 7 illustrate the relation between fair values of the participation coefficient, , and the guaranteed interest rate, U * , for some fixed and representative values of the remaining parameters.
It is first noted that all these graphs are negatively sloped as a higher participation coefficient must necessarily be associated with a lower guaranteed interest rate in order for the contract to be fair to both sides (note in particular that the wealth distribution coefficient, , is held fixed at 0.80 in these examples).
Figure 5
Fair Contracts, Relation between δ and r G α =0.80, r=6%, T=20, λ =0.80 Looking at Figure 5 we see that for high values of the participation coefficient, i.e. for values above approximately 0.6, where the bonus option element dominates the liabilityholders' contract, a decrease in volatility, , would require a higher guaranteed rate if the value split is to remain unaffected. When is low and the conditional fixed payment element and the rebate element dominate, this relationship is reversed. Note also that at the 'point' where the three curves intersect, the fair contracts are approximately volatility neutral in the sense that the effects on the various contract elements of changing the volatility almost exactly offset each other. This feature of the contracts studied is similar to a phenomenon which corporate financial economists refer to as The Case for Convertibles. We mentioned earlier the close relation between the contract studied here and convertible securities. Brennan and Schwartz (1993) offered one of the first satisfactory explanations for the use of convertibles in corporate financing by referring to the relative insensitivity of their value to the risk of the issuing company. Due to the similarity in design this property is shared by the insurance contracts described in this paper and the possibility to obtain risk insensitive liabilities by appropriate design of contracts is a separate point which insurers may find interesting to explore further.
The graph in Figure 6 is very similar to the previous picture except that the three curves represent different values of time to maturity, 7 . Again there seems to be a small set of values of U * and for which the value of the liabilityholders' contract is insensitive with respect to changes in the time to maturity. Figure 7 is a typical picture of the effect of changes to the boundary level parameter, , on the set of fair combinations of and U * . We note that a higher value of benefits the liabilityholders (provides better security against losses) and hence requires U * and/or to be lowered in order for the contract to remain fair. Although it is not immediately obvious that a higher always works to the benefit of liabilityholders regardless of the values of the other parameters, we have not been able to generate plots which did not look similar to those in Figure 7 .
Figure 7
Fair Contracts, Relation between δ and r G α =0.80, r=6%, T=20, σ =15% Delta, δ Alpha, α σ=10% σ=15% σ=20%
Figure 9
Fair Contracts, Relation between δ and α r=5%, r G =2%, T=20, σ =20% we note that increasing the participation coefficient towards its maximum value of 1 will force the wealth distribution coefficient, , towards the value of 1 as well. This means that in the limit where liabilityholders receive the entire surplus they will also find themselves as the sole group of stakeholders, i.e. no investors demanding fairness will provide equity for such a 'company'.
Secondly, it is observed that for any given or there is a lower boundary to the participation coefficient that can be offered in a fair contract. In Figure 8 for example, with , we see that no contract with lower than approximately 0.836 can be fair to the liabilityholders. When volatility is increased this bound is generally lowered. With volatility set at 20% for example, there are fair contracts with as low as 0.736. Thirdly, it is noted that for some, but not all, values of there are two distinct values of which, in conjunction with the other parameters, each represents a fair contract.
Value Components of Fair Contracts
In the analytical part of the paper we derived value formulas for each of the components which make up the various contracts. These separate values did not emerge from the figures discussed
above, but Table 2 shows some examples of how the total contract value at the time of negotiation decomposes into the separate elements.
In the table we have set the total initial assets, $ , at 100 and , implying that the sum of the liability contract elements should equal 80 and that the sum of the values of the equityholders' claim elements should equal 20. The risk free interest rate and the guaranteed rate are fixed at 5% and 2% respectively. Time to maturity, 7 , is 20 years. Each panel of the table represents a different value of from the set I J which includes the minimum
and maximum values of . Within each panel, volatility varies between 10% and 25% and the participation coefficient, , has been numerically determined as the value which makes the contract fair, i.e. 9 / is computed to equal 80.
[Insert Table 2 if volatility is increased, must be lowered to maintain a fair value distribution a larger volatility tends to increase the value of the rebate element and to decrease the value of the conditional fixed payment. This is, of course, explained by the fact that generally a larger volatility is associated with a larger probability of an early 'barrier hit'.
the larger the smaller the value of the shorted put option element of the liabilityholder's contract, and when this element disappears entirely. Remember that the idea of introducing the regulatory boundary was precisely to reduce the value of this element.
as expected, the value of the equity rebate element is nil when and positive when ! .
When (the Briys-Varenne special case) the value of the rebate to liabilityholders is zero.
In the other extreme case where (last row of Table 2 ) the contracts cannot really be initiated because $ 'sits' on the boundary and the initial investment is immediately paid out as a rebate.
We leave it to the reader to study the further details of the table.
State Dependent intermediate Contract Values
The previous analyses of this section were all centered on constructing and valuing fair contracts at the date of inception, i.e. at time zero. It is an important property of our model that it can identify fair contracts for a given set of initial conditions. However, it is equally important that the model can price contracts and their constituting elements at any given point in time given the initially specified terms and conditions, and given information about the present state of the world. It is this model property which makes it a potentially useful tool in relation to the increasing popularity of market value based accounting in the life insurance and pension business. Properly applied the model can simply deliver the market values required for market value reporting in the accounting statements and on the balance sheets. At this place it is in order to emphasize that an informative mark-to-market reporting of the value of the liabilities would require that the option to default is separately disclosed in the balance sheet or in the notes to the accounts. This would provide investors, policyholders, and regulators with an item representing the value of the promises, undiminished by the default probability of the insurer, and a second item representing the value of the put option to default. Suppose conversely that the option to default is not unbundled from the other components of an insurance contract. Then mark-to-market of the liabilities would reduce their value (preserving economic surplus) when an insurer approaches insolvency. In turn this would wrongly suggest the insurer to be in better financial health than when the insurer must report the value of liabilities on a gross basis that is not reduced by the prospects of insolvency. 19 It follows that the estimated value of the put option to default should be a figure of particular interest to regulatory authorities.
In relation to the above discussion and as our final numerical examples we present the following little cartoon of plots of the values of the components of the liabilityholders' contracts as a function of the state variable, $ W , at different times during the life of the contract. The contract parameters have been set so that the contract was fair at W and the contract elements values are plotted for W (right after inception), W , W , and W 7 (the maturity date). 19 We are grateful to Professor David F. Babbel for communicating these insights to us. See also Babbel (1999) .
Figure 10a
Liability Note in particular that the plots start out not from a zero value of $ W but from the boundary value at time W and that this lower point of the asset value moves upward as time passes in accordance with the imposed exponential boundary. Note also how the graphs depicting the total liability value tend towards the sharply kinked maturity payoff diagram which was shown earlier in Figure 2 . 20 Furthermore, it is seen that the conditional fixed payment part of the contract increases in value as $ W increases and makes a premature rebate payment less likely. For the same reason the value of the rebate decreases in $ W . The put option value is negligible unless $ W is in the narrow window between / * 7 and / * 7 (for ) and W is close to 7 .
Similar plots of the model's state dependent market valuation of the equity can be constructed but are omitted here for space considerations.
Conclusions
This article develops a model in which life insurance liabilities and equity are treated as composite contingent claims with various embedded option features. The equityholders' contract is modeled as a residual claim on total assets reflecting the limited liability of this group of claimants. The liabilityholders' contract is carefully modeled to reflect some key properties of real-life participating contracts: the guaranteed interest rate which must at least be credited each period, the right to receive a fair share of any investment surplus (i.e. participation as dictated by the contribution principle),
as well as first claim on company assets in the event of default.
Moreover, we have assumed the existence of a regulatory authority which monitors the mutually formed company continuously and which has the power to shut down the company if a certain solvency requirement is not met. In this case, recovered assets are distributed prematurely to the stakeholders. The regulatory mechanism introduces a true dynamic element to the model but it also complicates matters considerably by inducing barrier features into the contracts' embedded option elements. However, closed valuation formulas for the two contract types and their constituting elements can be established.
The paper discusses how these valuation formulas are useful from at least two perspectives.
First, they can be implemented to determine the set of parameters that characterizes initially fair contracts in the sense that the model's valuation of the contingent contract corresponds to the initial premium. Second, the model can be used for fair market valuation of the equity and liability entries of the company's balance sheet after the inception of the contracts following changes in market conditions (state variables). This form of application is in line with recent initiatives by the accounting profession (FASB, IASC) which seems to continue the process of strengthening its recommendations in favor of market value accounting.
Some of the model properties were explored and discussed via representative numerical examples. For example, comparing the results of our model with those of the 'static' model of Briys and de Varenne (1997) we saw that a regulatory intervention boundary can place an effective restriction on the value of the limited liability put option. This observation indicates that the companies' po-tential moral-hazard problem, which is created by the incentives to change the risk characteristics of its assets in order to cause a transfer of wealth from policyholders to equityholders, is overestimated in the static model.
Some natural paths for further research emerge. We have already mentioned the fact that many insurers now face claims from distinct groups of liabilityholders distinguished by different guaranteed interest rates in their policies. This raises the problem of how to avoid inequitable treatment of different classes of policyholders within the same fund. Some companies -like JØP in Denmark -have had tremendous concerns over the definition of a correct and fair distribution policy when the situation of the asset side does not permit the application of an identical surplus distribution policy across all policyholders. 21 The model presented here could be extended to include more than one homogenous class of policyholders. This could guide these companies to a more correct policy based on market value considerations. It would also be straightforward to incorporate mortality risk into the model along the lines in e.g. Jensen, Jørgensen, and Grosen (2001) .
Another possible extension of our model would be to incorporate a third stakeholder in the form of an external guarantor of the liabilityholders' deposits. Such a scheme could be fair to all sides if the guarantor is compensated for the issued guarantee in the form of a contingent payoff (rebate) out of recovered assets if the company is closed.
Finally, as discussed earlier the cost of a default-triggered put option as the one issued by a guarantor is significantly reduced if introducing a regulatory boundary as suggested in this paper.
Hence it would be natural to let the jobs as solvency monitor and default guarantor go hand in hand. A small digression from this research direction could be to restrict monitoring events (audits) to a discrete set of dates. By the law of total probability we have
We note that the left-hand side of (A.1) is described by a simple normal distribution and proceed to manipulate the second term of the right-hand side: which was to be proven (and which establishes an error in Ingersoll (1987) ). Assume $ W ! % W (the barrier is approached from above) and let ¡ denote the first passage time of $ through %, i.e. the smallest X such that $ X % X . Substituting for $ X and % X using (B.1) and (B.2) we see that an equivalent problem is to establish the first passage time density of Brownian motion with drift through the origin. where I is the density derived in (A.2). Equation (B.3) must hold since the probability that the origin has not yet been reached at time ¡ (the left-hand side) must equal the probability that absorption has not occured (right-hand side). We thus have 
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